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THE CASE FOR THE JURY SYSTEM
JOSEPH

T.

KARCHER*

The tempo of
the jury system has been under attack.
attack is increasing today. Avowed opponents of the system are marshalling their forces for the battle. They believe that
the time for a successful attack has arrived. The rapid growth in
population, particularly in our urban centers; the mechanization
and speed-up of all our activities; the heavy increase in taxes due
to the cost of government; a general dissatisfaction with anything
and everything that smacks of "the old order"; are all considered
factors which favor a change. Basic concepts in almost every field
of endeavor are at present under attack. Even God, country,
motherhood and morality are not immune. Hence it is not surprising to find the jury system also included as "suspect" or
"decedent." A careful analysis of "the Case for the Jury System"
would seem to be in order.

Fthat

OR YEARS

JURY SYSTEM BROUGHT TO ENGLAND

1066

The name "Jury" is derived from the French word "Jur6,"
meaning "sworn." Contrary to common belief, it did not originate
with the Magna Carta in 1216. And this is true even though
England is known as the "Cradle of the Jury System." History
records that the jury was in use in one form or another as early
as 800 A.D. by the Normans. It was brought to England with the
Norman Conquest in 1066. Prior thereto the English system of
resolving disputes included such proceedings as trial by combat and
trial by ordeal. In fact, trial by ordeal existed concurrently with
trial by jury for over a century. It was not until 1214 that Pope
Innocent III condemned trial by ordeal. It was 1272, at the end of
the reign of Henry III, before jury trials were permitted in England
for civil as well as criminal cases, thus wiping out entirely the system of feudal procedures which had been in effect for centuries
before.
LL.B. 1927 Rutgers University.
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MAGNA CARTA CONFIRMS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

The background of Magna Carta is interesting. King John
had become progressively more tyrannical. So much so that even
the Barons, upon whom he depended to maintain his throne, were
being deprived of some of their prerogatives by the Sovereign. To
protect themselves and their own supporters (the small landowners), these Barons joined together in what today would probably be called a revolution and threatened to depose the King by
force of arms unless their rights as freemen were guaranteed.
Finally, after years of controversy, King John and the Barons met
on the meadows of Runnymede in 1216 and the King reluctantly
signed one of the most famous documents of all times, Magna
Carta. Its pertinent provisions so far as guarantees of trial by jury
are concerned were as follows:
39. No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or outlawed or exiled
or in any way harmed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send
upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.
40. To none will we sell, to none deny or delay, right or justice.

This phraseology indicates in some small measure what the
average man had to contend with before the document was signed.
While it was originally intended to protect the nobility, by its
terms it was so framed as to protect all freemen, i.e., landowners.
Still later, all the tenant farmers working for the landowners were
also included.
Centuries later, Blackstone in his famous eulogium paraphrased the rights of trial by jury guaranteed every Englishman as
follows:
The founders of the English Laws have with excellent forecast,
contrived that no man should be called to answer to the King for

any capital crime, unless upon the preparatory accusation of twelve
or more of his fellow subjects, the Grand Jury; and that the truth of
every accusation whether preferred in the shape of indictment,
information, or appeal should afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors, indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion.
While the phraseology may seem a little awkward in our day,
the intent is clear. The Grand Jury grew out of the basic general
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idea of a trial by jury and as a preliminary to it. As originally
brought to England, a jury consisted of neighbors and residents of
the very neighborhood in which the incident complained of occurred. Hence their decision was based originally on what they
knew of their own knowledge about a case rather than what they
heard from witnesses. Today this procedure is prohibited. Juries
decide fact questions based only upon the sworn testimony of witnesses who are subject to confrontation and cross-examination before them. They then decide the issue solely on that evidence.
Extraneous evidence is not permitted or considered.
COLONISTS PROTEST DENIAL IN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

When the American colonists came to America they brought
with them the sacred right of trial by jury. To them it was the safest
and surest bulwark against the tyranny of the sovereign state. Prominent in their list of grievances against King George III, as set forth
in the Declaration of Independence, was the fact that they were
being deprived of this right of trial by jury.
The struggle of the so-called average man, the man on the
street, to secure the protection of his individual rights to life, liberty
and property had been dearly fought. It had not been easily won.
The fight had been long and bitter. He had suffered for centuries
under the tyranny of despotic Kings. It had taken a revolution and
almost a miracle to secure these rights. The memory of the cruel
injustices he had suffered prior to the advent of the jury system
were still fresh in his mind three or four centuries later. The rights
were not to be given up lightly. It was only logical that he should
cling to these precious rights and fight a war, if necessary, to secure
them for himself and his descendants.
And when the American Revolutionary War was over, the
right of trial by jury in all criminal matters was incorporated in
the United States Constitution. Later, as part of the Seventh
Amendment, the right of trial by jury was expanded to all civil
matters involving twenty dollars or more, and under the Common
Law. Thus it is, that for almost eight centuries, and despite an
occasional miscarriage of justice, trial by jury still remains the best,
safest, surest and perhaps the only bulwark to the average citizen
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to protect him in the enjoyment of his basic rights as a free man and
a citizen.
SYMBOL ONLY OR KEY TO LIBERTY?

There is a growing school of thought that contends that the
benefits from jury trials are more or less sentimental, illusory, or
fictional. This school contends that the administration of justice,
the preservation of law and order, and the ordinary processes of
society would not be greatly disturbed if the jury system were abolished. Not so! Just as we are inclined to take for granted or to place
little value on our health-until we lose it-so it is with the jury
system. We cannot begin to conceive the extent to which this loss
would injure our freedom. Government is an instrument of the
law. The law presumably is made for the benefit of the people. It is
also made by the people through their representatives. It is axiomatic that the law as made should therefore reflect the will of the
people. It is well enough to say that changes in the law should be
made through the election process, but this is a long, drawn-out
process. In the meantime, an Establishment, once in power, and
with full control over the courts, would have the wherewithal to
thwart the will and the wishes of the public at every turn, if it so
desired. Free speech, free press, freedom of assembly and all the
other rights are enforced and protected and assured through the
judicial process. The only part of that judicial process which the
public itself participates in is the jury system. That is why those
thoughtful persons who realize its significance cling so tenaciously
to the jury system. It is more than a symbol of their liberty. It is in
fact the key to the preservation of their liberties.
GROWTH OF UNITED STATES KEYED TO THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

In the opinion of many knowledgeable persons, the jury system
has played a large part in America's growth and strength and development. No nation in history has gone as far, or grown as great
or strong or rich in such a short span of less than 200 years. England
grew to be the leading world power during the period in which she
had a similar system for the administration of justice and the enforcement of law and order.
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It is true that to a large extent England has now abandoned
trial by jury in civil cases. Since 1933 only a few isolated types of
civil matters, amounting to less than 5% of her civil calendar, have
been tried by jury. But this system was abandoned unwillingly and
regretfully. World War I weakened England. The great depression
weakened her still further. It is noteworthy that there has been a
steady decline in the power and prestige of England, not only economically and militarily, but politically, socially and morally as
well, ever since. Thus we see that England barely survived World
War II-and then only with the tremendous material and military
aid of the United States. She has liquidated her empire. She readily
admits that she is now barely a second-rate power. Certainly, this
decline is not attributable solely to the abandonment of the jury
system. But it is pointed out as evidence of the rapid decline of a
once great nation, lest someone suggest that we follow suit in the
abolition of the jury system in civil matters because England in
effect has done so.
10 BASIC

CRITICISMS OF JURY SYSTEM

The most frequently heard criticisms of the jury system can
be roughly summarized under these ten headings, viz: (1) It is too
cumbersome; (2) It is too time-consuming; (3) It is too expensive;
(4) It delays justice and clogs the court calendars; (5) "Wrong"
verdicts are rendered in some criminal cases; (6) "Wrong" verdicts
are rendered in some civil cases; (7) Some civil verdicts are grossly
excessive; (8) Average jurors are not competent to adequately comprehend the law and the facts in the average case; (9) The public
is unwilling to serve as jurors; (10) Finally, there must be a
better way of administering justice.
If these points were valid the jury system would be in a bad
way indeed and deserve any fate meted out to it. The fact of the
matter is, however, that few, if any, of these points can stand
critical analysis.
SYSTEM IS NOT CUMBERSOME, TIME-CONSUMING OR

Too

COSTLY

The first three of these objections can be treated together. The
basic answer is that assuming arguendo that the allegations are true,
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they are still insufficient to justify the abolition of the system. They
may call for corrections, reformations and improvements-but not
its abandonment. Justice is a precious commodity. It should not be
sacrificed or compromised merely to save time, trouble or expense.
When you compromise with truth you get untruth. When you
compromise with justice you usually get injustice. Justice is always
worth all it costs.
But there is a grave question as to whether the charges are
sound in the first place. Handled properly by competent, efficient,
dedicated public officials on a business-like basis, the calling,
selection and impanelling of a jury would not be either cumbersome, time-consuming or expensive. In many instances these functions are still being performed in a manner reminiscent of the
horse-and-buggy days. The modern mechanical facilities such as
electronic computers for programing, screening, selecting, rejecting, segregating and notifying jurors have not as yet been adopted
in most jurisdictions. The antiquated method in use may very well
account for any excessive costs in the operation of this system. The
per diem fees paid to jurors certainly do not. In many cases jurors
are still being paid at 1918 wage rates. This literally forces them
into involuntary servitude. It actually forces them to personally
subsidize a branch of government, and this at a time when the
government is subsidizing everything from idleness to illegitimacy.
Some of these funds might well be spent on higher fees for jurors.
This increase is now more than a quarter of a century overdue.
THE JURY SYSTEM IS NOT THE PRIME CAUSE OF DELAY
OR CALENDAR

CONGESTION

Nor is there any validity to the charge that the system delays
justice unduly and clogs the court calendars. A nationwide study,
it is submitted, will reveal that the conditions complained of exist
primarily in the highly congested urban areas where there has been
an abnormal increase in population in recent years. In more than
80% of the country these conditions do not exist. It is conceded
that records do indicate that in such places as Cook County, Illinois,
Los Angeles County, California, and Nassau and a few other counties in New York, it does take as much as several years for a case to
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reach trial. But nationwide the average is estimated at only 12 to
15 months. Even in the congested states the average is estimated at
between 30 and 35 months. Incidentally, in the case of suits for
personal injury, which take up most of the court calendars, in the
case of major physical injuries it may take that long for medical
experts to determine the true end results of such injuries. Hence,
an earlier trial would be premature and perhaps harmful to the
cause of justice.
ALTERNATE SPEED-UP

METHODS AVAILABLE

New Jersey is a good illustration of what a heavily populated
state, in the metropolitan area, can do to bring court congestion
and trial delays within reasonable limits. Back in 1948, prior to the
surge in population, it completely revised its court system. Thus,
it has managed to keep pace with the growth of the state and the
tremendous increase in litigation. Of 21 counties, only 3 or 4 of the
most heavily populated ones have serious calendar congestion.
Additional judges, court rooms (even if rented) and additional trial
lawyers ready to try their cases may very well be the answer in these
counties. Acceleration in disposition of the criminal calendars in
recent months has added to the problem in these same counties, but
this is considered only a temporary condition. Meanwhile, the
Chief Justice and the Administrative Director of the Courts are
vigorously attacking the problems as they arise and introducing
modern methods which promise to keep the conditions reasonably
in hand for the foreseeable future. It is undoubtedly true that many
more reforms and improvements are desirable and actually required. There is every assurance that they will come.
Included among the possible alternate methods of clearing the
trial calendars are the following: (a) Separate trials as to liability
only in all cases (which are usually followed by prompt settlements); (b) Revival of the pretrial system in automobile cases in
more than a perfunctory manner; (c) Compulsory settlement conferences; (d) Separate trial lists for cases where the asserted defenses
appear purely technical (such as passenger, pedestrian and rear end
collision cases); (e) Imposition of the jury costs on the losing party:
(f) Imposition of interest on the amount of judgment retroactive
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to the day of the accident; (g) Changing the non-unanimous verdicts in civil cases to 9 to 3 or even 8 to 4 volume of trials increase.
But abolition of the jury system does not seem to be among the
remedies to be considered. Both the plaintiff and defense bars
would oppose such a recommendation almost to a man. Even the
so-called "corporation lawyer" regards the jury system with too
much reverence to stand idly by and see it perish in the name of
efficiency or economy or speed.
OCCASIONAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL

CASES

NOT DUE TO JURY SYSTEM

It is undoubtedly true that in some criminal cases the verdict
rendered represents a miscarriage of justice. Nothing is perfect. But
closer scrutiny will probably reveal that the "wrong" verdict was
not the fault of the jury or of the system. The case may not have
been properly investigated, prepared or presented by the State. It
is easy enough to obtain an indictment, but a conviction by unanimous verdict is something different.
Then again, the Prosecutor's proofs, such as an alleged confession, may have been obtained in violation of some of the defendant's constitutional rights. Or some of the recent rulings of our
higher courts may have imposed more stringent restrictions on the
law enforcement agency than they had anticipated or for which
they were prepared. Obviously, all of these facts have nothing to do
with the effectiveness or capacity of the jury.
The State, or Prosecutor, may very well have failed to utilize
the jury system effectively. Perhaps he did not examine the jurors
with sufficient care on their voir dire. Perhaps he did not discover
and excuse those jurors who were clearly biased against any conviction. Perhaps he did not exercise the peremptory challenges permitted him by law to excuse summarily those jurors he suspected
of being biased. Or worse still, he may have permitted jurors to be
impanelled who by their very answers on voir dire indicated a
laissez faire attitude toward law enforcement or that they were willing to wink at violation of the moral code in their own lives as well
as in the lives of those accused of crime. If so, neither the jury nor
the jury system can be criticized for any miscarriage of justice.
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Incidentally, there are many built-in protections in the law to
prevent a miscarriage of justice against the defendant. If, at the end
of the State's case, the presiding Judge does not believe that the
State has made out a sufficient case to warrant a jury in convicting,
he may, on motion of the defense counsel or on the court's own initiative, take the case from the jury's consideration and direct a
verdict of acquittal. This occurs more frequently than most critics
of the jury system realize. Even on appeal, the Appellate Courts
have a right to review the evidence upon which a defendant was
convicted and if they find that the verdict was against the weight of
the evidence they may reverse the conviction.
OCCASIONAL "WRONG"

VERDICTS IN CIVIL CASES DUE TO

CAUSES OTHER THAN THE JURY

In civil matters as well, it is also conceded that there are occasional miscarriages of justice through improper jury verdicts. This

is not surprising when all of the variables and imponderables are
taken into consideration. The point is that they do not occur as
a matter of course or with great frequency. They are the exceptions
rather than the rule. Once again, on closer analysis it will be found
that when they do occur they are usually due to causes other than
the jury itself. Once again, as in criminal matters, the case may not
have been properly investigated, prepared or presented. Counsel
may not have examined the jury with the care, caution and circumspection he should have exercised to see that a truly fair and impartial and competent jury was impanelled to try the case. This
could have occurred through counsel's failure to exercise properly
either his peremptory challenges or his challenges "for cause."
In any event, if the verdict rendered is obviously the result of
mistake, partiality, prejudice or passion on the part of the jury, the
court has the power, on proper motion, to set aside the verdict and
award a new trial to the aggrieved party. The court does not hesitate to exercise this prerogative. Here is a built-in protection against
the miscarriage of justice in civil matters as well.
GROSSLY ExcESSIVE VERDICTS CAN BE REMEDIED BY COURT

The charge that in some civil cases the jury brings in verdicts
that are grossly excessive is true. What is overlooked is that this is
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once again the exception rather than the rule. In the vast majority
of cases the verdicts are not excessive, but these seldom appear in
the headlines of the daily press. It is only the exceptional case which
is considered so newsworthy. The result is that the public gets the
false impression that all or most verdicts are grossly excessive, which
is entirely contrary to the facts.
Even in the isolated cases where the jury exceeds its normal
bounds and renders an excessive verdict, the error can be and usually is promptly corrected by the trial court. Every aggrieved party
has the right to have his counsel make timely application for a new
trial on the grounds that the verdict is excessive. The trial judge
who heard all the evidence (and saw all the witnesses) has the right
and the duty to review that evidence. If he comes to the conclusion
that the verdict was in effect so excessive as to "shock the conscience
of the court," he has the power to set aside the verdict or reduce it
to a fixed figure which he believes to be fair and just. If the prevailing party does not accept the reduction a new trial is held. Sometimes the trial judge limits the new trial to the question of damages
only, if the question of liability was not "tainted" by the excessive
verdict.
COMPOSITE ACUMEN,

COMPETENCE AND VIRTUE OF THE JURY

EQUALS THAT OF SINGLE JUDGE

The charge that the average juror is not competent to determine the facts or to comprehend and apply the law properly is
likewise without foundation. The jurors usually represent a true
cross-section of the community, of average intelligence, capacity
and virtue. They bring a fresh, alert, unbiased approach to each
and every case upon which they sit. If the judge alone were to try
the case there is no guarantee that any better grade of justice would
be administered. Judges are also human. Some are weak, while
others are strong. Some are emotionally stable-others are equally
susceptible to emotional appeals. And while most judges are undoubtedly honest and honorable and impartial and capable, there
have been some exceptional cases where a few of them have been
found not to be.
It would therefore appear that a composite of the intelligence
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and fairness and balance and dedication of the average juror is at
least as good a guarantee that a correct verdict will be rendered as
if the jury were dispensed with. Extensive surveys show that the
collective recall of evidence and the collective intelligence of 12
jurors is at least equal to, if not superior to, the same capacities of
a single jurist. The judges themselves, when polled on their views
as to the accuracy of jury verdicts, agree, even among themselves,
that in over 80% of the cases at which they had presided the jury
brought in the same verdict which they would have brought in
themselves had they been sitting alone.
PUBLIC ENJOYS JURY SERVICE WHEN TREATED PROPERLY

Anyone who contends that the general public is opposed to
serving as jurors is mistaken. It is not the "serving" as jurors which
they dislike, it is being called to jury duty and then being made to
sit around twiddling their thumbs while they are shunted around
from one jury assembly room to another; made to wait interminably until they are called; excluded from the courtroom every time a
motion is argued; immobilized for hours after they are selected to
sit on a case while the judge and the lawyers and the parties negotiate settlements which should have been negotiated before they
were drawn and impanelled.
Talk to any juror who has served and he will tell you (1) That
it was a new experience for him; (2) That he enjoyed it; (3) That it

gave him a new insight into how government operated, particularly
the judicial branch; (4) That he had a feeling of pride and satisfaction that he was able to play an integral part in the administration of justice.
It is true that large segments of the population are excused
from jury duty and that many others ask to be excused for reasons
of personal hardship when they are called. But it is also true that
there is never a scarcity of public spirited citizens still ready, willing
and able to serve. And this is true although they are still being paid
only $5.00 per diem in many states-the amount Henry Ford was
paying his laborers 50 years ago! If there is any unwillingness on
the part of the general public to serve as jurors the reasons are obvious. The remedies are also obvious.
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JURY SYSTEM

HAS STOOD THE TEST OF ALMOST

8

CENTURIES

Is there a better way to administer justice than through the
jury system? If there is, no one has yet found it. The jury's function
is primarily to consider the evidence; determine the weight and
credibility to be given to it; decide what the facts are; apply the
law as given by the court to those facts; and then decide which side
should prevail. The charges that it is cumbersome, time-consuming
and expensive cannot be sustained. Nor can the suggestion that the
jury system is the prime cause of delay in the courts and the calendar
congestion be proven by the facts. While it is true that there are
some erroneous verdicts rendered in both criminal and civil
matters, these are both few and far between. They are usually due
to causes other than the jury system. Moreover, there are built-in
protections in the law to remedy such errors when they occur. As to
excessive verdicts, these, too, are infrequent and can be reduced or
set aside by the court and a new trial ordered.
As to the competency and capacity of the average juror to
understand a case and render a just verdict, even the judges themselves concede the jurors' decisions in over 80% of the verdicts
rendered conform with their own determination of what the verdict
should have been. The composite intelligence, dedication, comprehension, evidence recall, and the emotional balance and ability to
render a just, fair and impartial verdict is at least equal to, if not
superior to, that of a single judge. The public is ready, willing and
able to serve as jurors if treated properly and compensated adequately. For most of them it is their single opportunity to participate in the workings of their government and in the processes of
democracy. Moreover, it is the most sensitive and telling area of
government-the administration of justice and the maintenance of
law and order. They apparently sense the importance of this function to themselves, to the litigants and to the government as a whole.
It is the considered judgment of most members of the Bench
and Bar that the right to trial by jury is as good, as useful, as sacred
as it ever was. It is still a bulwark against tyranny. It is still the
surest guarantee of the protection of the average citizen to life,
liberty and property. It is still the "Lamp of Liberty." It is still
worth every cent that it costs. It can be and it should be strength
ened and improved. But it must be preserved-not abolished.
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